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This paper presents the relationship between different types of blockholders with 
information asymmetry in Malaysian firms. To be more specific, this study divides the 
ownership structures into managerial blockholder, institutional blockholder and individual 
blockholder and ownership concentration while holding firm size and trading volume as 
control variables. On the other hand, the stock volatility and bid-ask spread are used as a 
proxy for information asymmetry. A sample of the top 150 largest public listed firms in term 
of market capitalisation is chosen from Bursa Malaysia from 2011 to 2015. Panel regression 
analysis is used to examine the data. The results show managerial blockholders, firm size and 
trading volume significantly influence information asymmetry. While institutional 
blockholders, individual blockholders and ownership concentration exhibit no relationship 
with information asymmetry. The study from this result can be useful for investors and the 
policymakers in Malaysia as it gives a clearer picture and more understandings on ownership 
structures and information asymmetry in the Malaysia market. 
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Introduction 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s Agency Theory, the managers will not always act 
in the best interest of shareholders due to conflict of interest. However, there is a remedy to 
reduce the conflict between manager and shareholders, which aligns the interest of managers 
with shareholders. Based on the theory, it suggested that whenever there is managerial 
ownership, the interests of shareholders and managerial block holders are aligned. 
Nevertheless, Jensen and Meckling further pointed out the expropriate wealth of minority 
shareholders by the block holders, where the large shareholdings of the share will lead to an 
increase in incentive to take advantage of small shareholders. Hence, it can be concluded that 
managerial ownership does reduce agency cost, but at the same time, it also increases the 
conflict with minority shareholders. 
 
